Eneva (ENEV3)

November 30, 2025

Utilities

The Flexibility Compounder: Optionalities Create Multi-Year Growth Path

Initiating Coverage with a Buy Rating and YE26 TP of R$27.1/sh.

We are initiating coverage on Eneva with a Buy-rating and establishing the company as another LT compounder (but it could easily be a ST/Momentum name as well). ENEV's investment case is based on: i) a management team that has been able to allocate ~R$25bn of capital since its 2017 restructuring, at average realized IRRs >20% in real terms; ii) a potentially transformational event in which we will dive very deep in this report (the 2026 LRCAP) that could add R$11.8/sh. (already included in our base case) and iii) Eneva is the most well positioned company in Brazil to be a full provider of flexible gas throughout the next 10-15 years, an attribute in which we believe will only gain more value over time. Our YE26 target price stands at R$27.1/sh., implying a hefty 37% upside and 12.7% real IRR. You will find in this report, a detailed section tackling the LRCAP from competition, to what to expect in terms of cap prices and a theoretical assessment that could justify demand of the auction >20GW. Eneva becomes one of our preferred names in the sector and replaces Copasa (alongside Axia, Copel, Sabesp, Equatorial, Orizon, Light and Energisa) as we see the company as the only one in our coverage that combines good fundamentals and momentum.

An impressive capital allocation track record, and we don't see the engine stopping. Since its 2017 re-structuring, Eneva has made transformational moves every other year. With an accumulated R$25bn deployed since then, the company has been a value creation machine, yielding ~35% annualized returns for investors since then. The story had its ups and downs and prior to the renewed expectations surrounding the upcoming LRCAP, ENEV's thesis had partially gone into disbelief, but time and a well outlined strategic path in a sector that presents enormous opportunity sets eventually correct these trajectories. This success story did not come without failed expectations (such as the thermal auction from ELET`s privatization bill in which the market expected R$6-7bn!!! in NPV and the company delivered R$4-5bn!!!). These past events teach us a lesson that is valuable in times of more pronounced extremes between despair and euphoria (expectation management is an important driver to avoid permanent losses of capital).

A >R$20bn event: the Reserve Capacity auction is perhaps the most relevant event in ENEV's history. The LRCAP is another milestone event that makes ENEV a case of relevant allocation opportunities over time. While these opportunities aren't linear and recurring, when they appear they bring tremendous upside potential. Assessing the outcomes of this event is a hard task, but one thing is undeniable: Eneva has the most competitive fleet of existing and greenfield natural gas thermal plants in the auction (as well as 2 of 3 coal-fired plants that will participate). We estimate ENEV could be able to win ~2.5GW of greenfield projects (Celse 2 and Ceiba), as well as recontract 2.0GW of existing thermal capacity (P1 and P3, Coal assets, 150MW of thermal capacity recently acquired by BTG and Termofortaleza). Combined these assets add R$22bn in NPV (or 8.6p.p. In IRR) to our base case. At current levels, we believe the market is pricing in: P1 and P3, and the Coal-fired assets (as dispatch and LNG monetization assumptions might be more conservative than us). It is important to keep in mind that, beyond these assets ENEV still has ~4-5GW of additional pipeline that could continue to be a growth propeller in the thermal segment for future reserve capacity auctions (as we don't expect these to stop).

What's worth being one of the largest providers of flexibility in the country? The optionality and opportunity set to be positioned as the most relevant provider of flexibility to the country is tremendously undervalued. In case ENEV can secure a new LNG hub (Ceara) in the upcoming auction, the company will have ~25% of Brazil's LNG capacity (and a much larger share of idle LNG capacity). As is the case with power, the opportunity cost of a flexible gas output brings several opportunities. Beyond that, we see room for the company to continue its monetization journey of onshore gas and LNG flexibility over the next years. We assume in our base case that: i) 100% of the SSLNG capacity of ~900k/m3 day will be monetized until 2044 at ~U$14/mmBTU and ii) Celse's LNG terminal will also be fully monetized during the lifespan of its lease at U$0.75/mmBTU, as well as assume that the current JKM/Brent trading window adds ~R$150mn in pre-tax contribution margins overtime. And this is only the tip of the iceberg as Eneva can successfully develop a new LNG hub in the upcoming auction, it can add more SSLNG capacity in its Parnaiba complex to tap the ~9mn m3/day TAM of the MATOPIBA logistics corridor, among new ventures such as the monetization of Jurua, new E&P campaigns in the Paraná Basin, among other optionalities that continue to create growth avenues at highly accretive returns for the company.

Eneva	ENEV3
Rating	**Buy**
Target Price (R$/sh.)	**27.1**
Current Price (R$/sh.)	19.9
Upside (%)	*37%*
Market Cap (R$ billion)	38.5
# of shares (million)	1,937
Free Float (%)	37%
ADTV (R$ million)	192

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

Source: Company Data and XP Research

Summary


xp research
If all you have is 5 minutes

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November 30, 2025

All you Need to Know in Two Pages

Noteworthy analysis inside the report:

We have done a deep dive on the outlook for the LRCap in which we come out more optimistic about the odds of Eneva having a very successful auction. We see reasonable arguments to estimate the auction demand could be at least 20GW, we see limited available flexibility of existing LNG assets that could create a more competitive scenario for ENEV, we see Eneva's assets as extremely competitive given the global outlook for the thermal supply chain, which itself will push for higher cap prices at the auction. Our bottom-up pricing analysis indicates relevant upside (our base case assuming ENEV captures the cap price for Off-Grid Thermal is R$29/sh.)

Figure 01: Valuation Build-Up



Figure 02: Auction Breakdown Potential w/ 20GW Demand Scenario



Figure 03: LNG Terminals – Flexibility Analysis for the LRCAP

LNG Assets, mn m³/day	Capacity	XPe Idle Capacity
Guanabara - Petrobras	14.0	0.0
Bahia - Petrobras	14.0	0.0
Celse[1] - Eneva	**21.0**	**13.1**
Açu - GNA	21.0	0.0
Karpowership	8.5	5.0
Barcarena - NFE	15.0	0.0
TRSP - Edge (Compass)	14.0	0.0
TGS - NFE (Inactive)	15.0	0.0
Total	122.5	18.1
~GW Equivalent of Idle Capacity (@8 mmBTU/MWh Heat Rate)		3.5

[1]Already net of Celse 2 + other LT flexibility contracts

Figure 04: Energy S&D Analysis Considering Peak Thermal Generation Day

	2023a	2024a	2025a	2026e	2027e	2028e	2029e	2030e	2031e
Energy Demand (GWh)	**94**	**91**	**86**	**94***	**97**	**101**	**104**	**108**	**112**
Growth (%)		*-3.4%*	*-5.1%*	*3.5%*	*3.5%*	*3.5%*	*3.5%*	*3.5%*	*3.5%*
Generation (GWh)	**94**	**91**	**86**	**94**	**97**	**101**	**104**	**108**	**112**
Hydro	68	57	48	48	48	48	48	48	48
Wind	7	14	22	22	22	22	22	22	22
Nuclear	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Thermal	17	18	15	22	26	29	33	36	40
TPP's power capacity	27	27	27	29	30	30	30	30	30
Capacity becoming uncontracted				*9*	*11*	*11*	*11*	*11*	*12*
New capacity required	**-9**	**-9**	**-12**	**-6**	**-4**	**-1**	**2**	**6**	**10**
TPPs New Capacity + TPP w/o Contract				**2**	**7**	**10**	**14**	**17**	**22**

**Growth level in relation to 2024 value.*

Figure 05: Energy S&D Analysis Considering Peak Thermal Generation Days

	New Thermal On-Grid	New Thermal Off-Grid
Auction Price in R$/MWh	**342**	**286**
All-In Price @ Auction (R$'000/MW)	**3,000**	**2,509**
Fixed Revenue (R$'000/MW)	**2,768**	**2,277**
Transmission	137	137
O&M	167	167
Capital Cost	1,604	1,604
Take-or-Pay	**246**	**246**
LNG Terminal Leasing	**0**	**123**
Gas Transportation	**614**	**0**
Factor A * CVU (R$'000/MW)	**232**	**232**
CVU (R$/MWh)	**690**	**690**
Heat Rate	8.5	8.5
Fuel Unit Cost	14.8	14.8
Fx (BRL/USD)	5.5	5.5
Factor A (hours)	**336**	**336**
Time On	5.1	5.1
Ramp Up	0.6	0.6
Ramp Down	0.5	0.5
G Min/G Max	0.5	0.5
TOn - RUp - RD	4.0	4.0

Source: ONS, CCEE, Company Data and XP Research

If All You Have is 5 Minutes

All You Need to Know in Two Pages

i) LT compounders: these are the companies that have been able to systematically deploy capital at returns above their cost of capital either organically (via recurring capex in their own concessions or through new assets obtained through transmission/generation auctions) or via accretive acquisitions of existing assets. These names will usually carry similar characteristics of having long(er) durations and a capital allocation track-record that speaks by itself. Naturally, some names won't necessarily check all these boxes but will have elements like those mentioned above. As the compounding opportunities are not linear and don't happen systematically, our approach would be to continuously be holders of these names and adjust the size of the position according to relative valuations and the capital allocation potential of mapped opportunities occurring in the short-term.

ii) Momentum/ST triggers: the companies in this group might possess other elements that would make them fit in other groups, but we believe the exposure to specific ST triggers or momentum due to specific issues are the predominant element in the moment of the underwriting of the investment thesis. This group won't have any specific traits between themselves apart from the fact that we expect ST news/events/triggers that will drive the stock price.

iii) Mean reversion: this group is composed by companies that have no relevant triggers or events mapped in the ST and aren't perceived as names within the LT compounders. They are companies that might (or not) have valuation deviations to their fair values. In the long-run, relative IRRs tend to hover around the fair IRR (or Ke), and in this group our approach will be to try to capture any asymmetries that occur over time.

iv) 10-baggers: As Peter Lynch wisely summarized, these are companies that have the potential to multiply their current value by several times in the LT. For the names we cover, we believe ORVR has the right setup: i) the TAM (or SAM) that the company is exposed to is multiple times the size of the own company (e.g. low market share in a large market); ii) healthy competitive landscape that is measured by a market with low/fragmented competition and the company possessing tangible competitive advantages vs. its peers; iii) the market value of the company is sufficiently small vs. the size of the opportunity and iv) the business model is simple and understandable (manage waste at decent returns and monetize its subproducts that provide relevant incremental returns to the core business).

Figure 06: Valuation Summary (XPe)

Companies	Group**	Ticker	Rating	Share Price	Mkt Cap (R$mn)	ADTV (R$mn)	Target Price (YE26)	Total Return (%)	Real Implied IRR (%)	Duration	Ke, Real	Dividend Yield		EV/RAB	
												2025e	2026e	2025e	2026e
DisCos															
Equatorial	LT	EQTL3	Buy	39.8	49,791	319	53.4	34.2%	11.9%	10.8	10%	2.6%	4.0%	1.5x	1.4x
Energisa	LT	ENGI11	Buy	49.3	22,546	126	93.5	89.6%	16.6%	9.5	10%	3.9%	6.0%	1.5x	1.4x
Light	ST	LIGT3	Buy	3.5	5,688	7	6.2	74.8%	17.7%	7.6	12%	0.0%	0.0%	0.9x	0.7x
Integrated															
Neoenergia	ST	NEOE3	Buy	32.3	39,194	87	42.6	32.1%	11.6%	9.8	10%	3.3%	6.9%	1.6x	1.5x
CPFL	ST	CPFE3	Buy	48.8	56,195	72	45.4	-6.8%	8.0%	8.5	10%	7.1%	9.1%	1.7x	1.5x
Cemig	MR	CMIG4	Neutral	11.5	32,910	104	13.8	20.4%	13.3%	8.4	12%	6.4%	7.0%	1.2x	1.1x
Copel	LT	CPLE3	Buy	13.6	40,626	73	13.5	-1.1%	8.9%	9.0	10%	8.0%	5.9%	1.8x	1.7x
Axia	ST	AXIA3	Buy	62.5	144,372	435	59.3	-5.1%	8.7%	6.6	11%	8.3%	10.4%		
	ST	AXIA6	Buy	67.0	144,372	95	65.4	-2.4%	9.1%	6.6	11%	8.5%	10.6%		
TransCos															
Alupar	LT	ALUP11	Buy	33.9	11,181	22	36.2	6.8%	8.1%	11.4	8%	4.5%	4.6%		
Isa Energia	MR	ISAE4	Neutral	27.9	18,350	50	25.9	-7.1%	6.2%	9.3	8%	6.5%	6.7%		
Taesa	MR	TAEE11	Neutral	43.5	14,993	76	32.7	-25.0%	2.3%	6.0	8%	6.9%	7.9%		
GenCos															
Eneva	LT	ENEV3	Buy	19.9	38,488	179	27.1	36.5%	12.7%	8.0	10%	0.0%	0.0%		
Auren	MR	AURE3	Neutral	12.3	12,888	59	12.0	-1.9%	9.7%	8.4	12%	0.0%	3.3%		
Engie	MR	EGIE3	Neutral	30.6	35,000	57	29.1	-5.2%	7.1%	7.4	9%	3.3%	3.6%		
Sanitation															
Copasa	ST	CSMG3	Buy	41.6	15,830	79	41.6	0.0%	10.7%	8.0	12%	2.2%	2.0%	1.3x	1.4x
Sabesp	LT	SBSP3	Buy	141.0	96,368	389	162.4	15.2%	10.5%	9.1	10%	3.2%	3.9%	1.2x	1.1x
Sanepar	ST	SAPR11	Buy	37.4	11,295	45	45.9	22.8%	13.0%	6.9	12%	9.5%	14.9%	0.7x	0.7x
Waste Management															
Orizon	10x	ORVR3	Buy	64.3	7,023	27.1	67.7	5.4%	9.3%	7.0	10%	0.0%	0.0%		
Sector Avg.								**14.9%**	**10.3%**	**8.4**	**10%**	**4.4%**	**5.6%**	**1.3x**	**1.2x**

Source: Company Data, and XP Research

Company Overview

Company Overview

A Growing and Diverse Portfolio of Flexible and Competitive Gas Sourcing and Thermal Plants

Eneva operates and owns 6.5GW of thermal assets and 692MW of solar capacity. Out of the 6.5GW, ~3.0GW operate under the pioneer Reservoir-to-Wire "R2W" business model, where the company develops and operates thermal assets inside an E&P asset. These assets are backed by ~38bcm of gas in Eneva's Parnaiba basin and ~10bcm in the Amazonas basin through its Azulão asset. The company has added an additional 3.5GW of 3rd party gas assets at very accretive terms, with a noteworthy mention to its Celse asset that brought together a tremendously strategic LNG asset that gives the company ~15mn m³/day of flexible gas to be monetized overtime. Through a business model that has highly accretive unit economics in the R2W side of things and through a large-scale flexibility asset, Eneva has begun its journey to monetize gas through new commercial agreements such as a burgeoning SSLNG business in its Parnaiba asset and through flexible offtakes for other thermal players, large industries and the midstream operators through its FSRU located in Sergipe.

Beyond its existing assets, ENEV has a relevant pipeline of new thermal plants to be deployed (north of 4GW), ~20bcm in the Solimoes basin that could be a natural provider of gas in the LT for thermal assets in the state of Amazonas and the company is currently undergoing development and E&P activities in the Parana basin (a 70/30 JV between Eneva and Brava) to assess if there is economically viable gas reserves in a frontier region of the country that is strategically positioned to supply gas to the largest consuming region of the country.

Figure 07: Eneva's Portfolio Breakdown

Amazonas Cluster	Reservoir / Installed Capacity
Amazonas basin (Azulão)	9.8 bcm
Solimões basin (Juruá)	24.0 bcm
Azulão I	360 MW
Azulão II	590 MW
Jaguatirica II	141 MW
Total TPP	**1,091 MW**
Total Reservoir	**33.8 bcm**
Gas Consumption	**5.4 mm m3/d**

Maranhão Cluster	Reservoir / Installed Capacity
Parnaíba basin	37.6 bcm
Parnaíba I	676 MW
Parnaíba II	519 MW
Parnaíba III	178 MW
Parnaíba IV	56 MW
Parnaíba V (steam PI)	385 MW
Parnaíba VI (steam PIII)	92 MW
Geramar (Fuel Oil)	332 MW
SSLNG	0.9 mm m3/d
Total TPP	**2,238 MW**
Total Midstream	**0.9 mm m3/d**
Total Reservoir	**37.6 bcm**
Peak Gas Consumption	**12.0 mm m3/d**

Ceará Cluster	Reservoir / Installed Capacity
Pecém II (Coal)	365 MW
Itaqui (Coal)	360 MW
Termofortaleza (Gas)	327 MW
Total TPP	**1,052 MW**
Peak Gas Consumption	**1.6 mm m3/d**

Sergipe-Southeast Cluster	Reservoir / Installed Capacity
Celse 1 (Gas)	1,593 MW
FSRU	21.0 mm m3/d
Linhares (Gas)	240 MW
Viana (175MW Oil / 37MW Gas)	212 MW
Povoação (Gas)	75 MW
Total TPP	**2,120 MW**
Total FSRU Capacity	**21.0 mm m3/d**
Peak Gas Consumption	**7.0 mm m3/d**

Midwest/South Cluster	Reservoir / Installed Capacity
Paraná basin	TBD bcm
Total Reservoir	**TBD bcm**

Figure 08: Eneva's Assets by Geography



Source: ONS, CCEE and XP Research

Company Overview

A Capital Allocation Machine

Eneva's story since its post-restructuring re-IPO is one of serial capital allocations at highly accretive returns. The macro thesis behind the recurrence of these opportunities is the competitive advantage of Eneva's portfolio. With an impressive knowledge base that was constructed overtime, Eneva's geology teams has been able to successfully find new reserves in its Parnaiba basin, as well as underwrite a new frontier in the "forgotten" Amazonas basin. These assets positioned Eneva to be the most competitive provider of flexible natural gas for thermal assets in Brazil at the same time it has extremely competitive lifting costs. This combination of: i) flexible gas supply and ii) structural competitive advantages due to gas costs has boosted the company to over and over allocate capital at outsized returns. Additionally, the company's assertive LT vision of how the gas market is evolving has also enabled them to make bolder moves such as the Celse acquisition (which seemed expensive at a first glance, and now proves to have been a tremendous success given the strategic value of the assets and the optionalities it has created to the company). Since its re-IPO, ENEV deployed R$25bn in capital (M&As and Capex), with returns that on average surpassed 20% in real terms – an extremely rare combination of large opportunity set and outsized returns.

Figure 09: Eneva's Share Price Evolution and Capital Allocation Announcements



Source: Company Data and XP Research

Company Overview

Evolving from a Single R2W Business into a Thermal Powerhouse

If during the 2017-23 period, dispatch expectations in the Parnaiba Complex was extremely relevant, with the current R$11bn in contracted fixed revenues (26e ex-re-contracting assumptions), dispatch in the R2W segment is less of a risk (and source of upside). In our base case, ENEV's 2030e+ fixed revenues will reach R$21bn, while R2W variable revenues (assuming an avg. 45% and 55% dispatch for the Parnaiba and Azulão assets) will reach R$3-4bn.

It is also important to note that for a long time, lack of gas/the need of new E&P campaigns to continue to sustain LT dispatch expectations were a risk, we now assume ENEV will retain ~17bcm of gas in Parnaiba and ~2bcm in Azulão, a clear monetization optionality we don't consider in our estimates, as well as a clear indicator of the successful de-risking that occurred overtime.

Lastly, with the acquisition of Celse, the launch of its SSLNG and opening of a gas trading desk, we see further diversification into new fronts that reduce even further the correlation of value and dispatch for the company. When fully mature, SSLNG and the FSRU will contribute with ~10-15% of ENEV's EBITDA.

Figure 10: Evolution of Natural Gas Reserves & Reserve Replacement Ratio



Figure 11: Eneva's Revenue Breakdown – Fixed Revenues vs. Variable Revenues (R$bn)



Figure 12: Parnaíba's Contribution to Total Revenue



Source: ONS, CCEE and XP Research

Company Overview

Management, Board of Directors and Shareholders: A Top-Tier Management Team and BoD

Figure 13: C-Level Executives

Name	Position	Professional History
Lino Cançacado	CEO	Schlumberger
Marcelo Habibe	CFO and IRO	Embratel, Brookfield, VALE, Omega energia
Marcelo Cruz Lopes	Marketing, Commercialization and New Business VP	ONS, PETROBRAS
Flavia Heller	ESG and Strategy VP	Grupo Equatorial Energia, edp
Ricardo Pascotto	Operation and Maintenance of Generation Assets, R2W and SSLNG VP	AG Andrade Gutierrez, thyssenkrupp
Aurélio Amaral	External Relations and Communications VP	anp, MDC energia é valor, Schmidt Valois
Thiago Freitas	Legal, Governance, Compliance and Internal Controls VP	OABRJ
Renato Cintra	Corporate Services VP	Light, VALE, USIMINAS
Ricardo reis	Human Resources, Health, Safety and Environment VP	Schlumberger
Andrea Monte	Exploration, Development and Engineering VP	slb, SENSIA Rockwell Automation + SLB

Figure 14: Board of Directors



Figure 15: Shareholder Structure



Source: Company Data and XP Research.

A Deep Dive on the LRCAP

A Deep Dive on the LRCAP

Understanding the Auction Mechanics

The reserve capacity auction will be a complex auction in which outcomes are hard to predict. The auction will be broken down in two: i) one auction dedicated for two products that will aim to re-contract fuel-based assets starting 2026 and 2027 and a 2030 product for biodiesel powered assets and ii) an auction for gas, coal and hydro plants that will have products from 2026 until 2031 (products 2026, 2027 and 2028 will allow for existing assets to be re-contracted and Hydros will only have products in 2030-31).

Total demand will be based on technical parameters regarding future capacity needs for the system using risk aversion (CVaR) parameters and loss of load probabilities (LOLP). Demand estimates range from 10-25GW of capacity needs.

It is important to note that in its last PEN report, ONS (the system operator) has noted that from 2026 until 2029, the criteria's for LOLP and PNS (capacity not served) are breached, making it urgent to add new capacity to the system. Figure 17 shows that with the current capacity in place, the breach in LOLP is a base case and it only increases over time.

EPE, the energy research agency recently disclosed that ~120GW of projects registered to the auction, out of which, ~10GW are related to existing assets looking to be re-contracted (across fuel, coal and natural gas). The bulk of new projects are gas-fired and concentrated in the state of RJ (60GW of ~110GW) which implicitly automatically writes-off a huge chunk of these projects given transmission restrictions for such concentrated loads.

Cap prices for the auction will be disclosed early next year and will be a function of disclosed technical and financial parameters by players that registered in the auction, as well as a discretionary layers by the regulators to not allow for excessive pricing. Cap prices can also be set by product, limiting any potential asymmetries if there is limited competition in specific products.

Figure 16: Registered Capacity per Source (MW)



Figure 17: ONS Loss of Load Probability (LOLP) Analysis



Source: EPE

A Deep Dive on the LRCAP

Mapping Competition per Product

After doing a detailed analysis on the potential assets that could participate in the auction, we have mapped 12GW of existing capacity that could bid in the auction, broken down by source and economic group. The names that should benefit the most from the auction are: Eneva, Petrobras, J&F (Ambar) and potentially KPS.

Existing Fuel: ~2.5GW of fuel-fired assets should bid in the auction. It is still unclear whether the government will want to re-contract 100% of existing fuel assets or if it will cap these two products in a demand that is lower than the potential capacity. We believe it makes sense to cap the demand in these products in a lower range to incentivize competition and to gradually replace expensive and carbon-heavy assets towards alternative sources.

Existing Gas: ~8GW of gas-fired capacity with the main players being Petrobras, J&F (Ambar) and Eneva. We see Eneva's main assets (P1 and P3) as very competitive, and the thermal assets acquired by BTG with a good competitive advantage as they will use Celse's FSRU capacity to secure competitive sourcing. Petrobras should be competitive as well given that the company has fully amortized assets and competitive flexible capacity (~28mnm³/day of available LNG). Ambar also stands out and should be competitive in most of its assets, while assets like Uruguaiana should suffer more given the limited access to physical gas supply.

New Gas: These are harder to map and given the size of assets that registered for the auction (>100GW) indicate fierce competition. However, Eneva's Celse 2 asset is by far the most competitive asset as it is the only one that is a brownfield to an existing asset (yielding lower capex), already has an acquired turbine and benefits from having minimal fixed costs to secure its flexible gas needs (as the FSRU is already paid by Celse 1). Additionally, we see Eneva's 1.3GW CEIBA project in Ceara as a competitive one as well given that it will dilute costs with Eneva's Termofortaleza asset and is one of the largest scale projects registered (Termofortaleza + CEIBA combine for ~1.7GW). We recall that ENEV recently announced that it has entered into a JV with Diamante Energia for this specific project (economics undisclosed). Other players such as KPS could also bring competitive assets, while we see limited possibilities for other assets to leverage on existing LNG capacity, and limited size to be able to dilute the large costs to secure a new LNG terminal.

Existing Coal: Eneva and Diamante are the only ones with capacity in this product and should be able to re-contract at healthy prices given limited competition.

Figure 18: LRCap Existing Capacity per Product and per Economic Group (XPe)

Product (MW)	2026	2027	2028	2029	2030	2031
Diesel	2,547	2,547				
Natural Gas	6,113	6,966	7,293	7,293	7,293	8,273
Coal		1,445	1,445	1,445	1,445	1,445
Diesel						
Petrobras	828	828				
Âmbar	356	356				
EBRASIL	342	342				
Grupo Bolognesi	513	513				
GPE	372	372				
Companhia Energética de Petrolina	136	136				
Total	**2,547**	**2,547**				
Natural Gas						
Eneva	148	1,002	1,329	1,329	1,329	1,329
Âmbar	1,624	1,624	1,624	1,624	1,624	2,603
EDF	827	827	827	827	827	827
Orizon	20	20	20	20	20	20
CS Energia (Carlos Suarez)	349	349	349	349	349	349
Karpowership	569	569	569	569	569	569
Petrobras	2,576	2,576	2,576	2,576	2,576	2,576
Total	**6,113**	**6,966**	**7,293**	**7,293**	**7,293**	**8,273**
On-Grid	*87%*	*77%*	*73%*	*73%*	*73%*	*76%*
Off-Grid	*13%*	*23%*	*27%*	*27%*	*27%*	*24%*
Coal						
Eneva		725	725	725	725	725
Diamante Energia		720	720	720	720	720
Total		**1,445**	**1,445**	**1,445**	**1,445**	**1,445**

Source: ONS, CCEE and XP Research

A Deep Dive on the LRCAP

What Can we Expect for Demand?

Demand estimates for the auction is a complex job to gauge as the parameters that sustain the methodology, and calculations are complex and aren't widely available to the public. However, we can exercise the concept behind and eventually gauge what would make sense.

As reserve capacity will serve the system with the sole purpose to meet peak demand and/or events of scarcity of other power sources, one analysis could be to assess what the system would look like in these scenarios. Our approach was to assess what the hourly profile of the last 3 years have been at the point in time where the system has had its peak thermal output (usually in the month of November, between 7-10pm).

If we were to assume some load growth and a similar generation profile for the sources ex-thermal capacity going forward (assuming limited capacity growth in wind and hydro – solar has no dispatch at these times), we would reach a scenario where we could easily make the argument that the auction would require 15-20GW in demand (existing and new capacity) in 2030+. Other analysis such as peak hourly demand and maximum avg. daily demand also point to similar conclusions.

Figure 20: Energy S&D Analysis Considering Peak Thermal Generation Days

	2023a	2024a	2025a	2026e	2027e	2028e	2029e	2030e	2031e
Energy Demand (GWavg.)	94	91	86	94*	97	101	104	108	112
Growth (%)		*-3.4%*	*-5.1%*	*3.5%*	*3.5%*	*3.5%*	*3.5%*	*3.5%*	*3.5%*
Generation (GWavg.)	94	91	86	94	97	101	104	108	112
Hydro	68	57	48	48	48	48	48	48	48
Wind	7	14	22	22	22	22	22	22	22
Nuclear	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Thermal	17	18	15	22	26	29	33	36	40
TPP's power capacity	27	27	27	29	30	30	30	30	30
Capacity becoming uncontracted				*9*	*11*	*11*	*11*	*11*	*12*
New capacity required	-9	-9	-12	-6	-4	-1	2	6	10
TPPs New Capacity + TPP w/o Contract				2	7	10	14	17	22

**Growth level in relation to 2024 value.*

Figure 19: Existing and New Capacity Potential w; 20GW Demand Scenario



Figure 21: XPe Need for New and Existing Thermal Capacity to be Re-Contracted



Source: ONS, CCEE and XP Research

A Deep Dive on the LRCAP

Is there Enough Flexibility/LNG Capacity?

Another important piece of the puzzle is to understand what is the potential availability of flexible LNG capacity to be used in the auction, and in the hands of which player is the capacity held.

We've mapped ~120mn m³/day of LNG capacity, which seems like a high number given Brazil's avg. daily natural gas consumption of ~100mn m³/day. However, LNG terminals serve more as a safeguard of peak demand and as an operator of flexibility to the system. Additionally, each player has a different strategy on the uses and monetization paths for these assets. For instance, **Petrobras** has ~28mn m³/day of LNG capacity it will use for: i) securing flexible gas for its ~2.5GW of gas-fired assets and ii) as a provider of spot flexibility to the grid/consumers. **Eneva** will use its idle capacity in Celse to backup new projects in the auction, **Edge (owned by Compass)** is on a path to monetize its capacity through B2B sales.

Lastly, **New Fortress**' Barcarena asset is already at full usage, and its TGS asset in Santa Catarina is not operational as there isn't an allocated FSRU to the asset. And with the widely known financial trouble behind the company we don't see any capacity coming online in the ST.

Overall, we see limited flexibility available in existing assets in Brazil to support growth/competition in the upcoming auction and any relevant capacity would have to come coupled with new LNG assets, that requires large scale thermal assets to sustain the high embedded fixed-costs. We believe ENEV's Ceará project could be one of the most competitive new LNG projects in case the company secures CEIBA and Termofortaleza in the auction, which would boost Eneva's position as a provider of on and off-grid flexible gas solutions.

Another important point to keep in mind: assuming Brazil's installed gas-fired thermal capacity (ex-R2W) peak-consumption, our installed LNG base has an excess capacity of ~23.5mn m³/day, which translates to an ~4-5GW spare capacity, meaning that any new thermal capacity would necessarily have to come coupled with new LNG capacity.

Figure 22: LNG Terminals – Flexibility Offering Analysis for the LRCAP

LNG Assets, mn m³/day	Capacity	XPe Idle Capacity
Guanabara - Petrobras	14.0	0.0
Bahia - Petrobras	14.0	0.0
Celse[1] - Eneva	**21.0**	**13.1**
Açu - GNA	21.0	0.0
Karpowership	8.5	5.0
Barcarena - NFE	15.0	0.0
TRSP - Edge (Compass)	14.0	0.0
TGS - NFE (Inactive)	15.0	0.0
Total	122.5	18.1
~GW Equivalent of Idle Capacity (@8 mmBTU/MWh Heat Rate)		3.5

[1]Already net of Celse 2 + other LT flexibility contracts

Figure 23: S/D Analysis for Existing LNG Capacity vs. Peak-Thermal Demand

Current LNG S/D Scenario	
Existing LNG Capacity, mn m³/day	122.50
Natural Gas Thermal Capacity (ex-R2W), MW	19,250
Heat Rate, mmBTU/MWh	8.0
Total Peak Thermal Demand, mn m³/day	99.1
Over/Under Supply of Flexible LNG Capacity	23.45
~GW Equivalent of Oversupply	4.56

LNG S/D Scenario with +7GW of Gas-fired Capacity	
Existing LNG Capacity, mn m³/day	122.50
Natural Gas Thermal Capacity (ex-R2W), MW	26,250
Heat Rate, mmBTU/MWh	8.0
Total Peak Thermal Demand, mn m³/day	135.1
Over/Under Supply of Flexible LNG Capacity	-12.57
~GW Equivalent of Undersupply	-2.44

Source: ONS, CCEE and XP Research

A Deep Dive on the LRCAP

A Bottom-Up Approach on Potential Cap Pricing

A big question mark regarding the auction is what will be the cap prices, and if there will be differentiated prices per product. We believe there will be different cap-prices per product but believe is too hard to gauge what would be the price per product. However, we have done a bottom-up analysis on what price level would make new assets both on and off-grid viable assuming a certain set of parameters.

Our conclusion is that for new thermal assets that have competitive LNG sourcing (e.g. capacity large enough that dilutes the fixed LNG costs), cap prices should be in the range of R$2.5mn/installed MW or ~R$285/MWh of peak-production. The same analysis for on-grid assets indicate for ~R$3.0mn/installed MW as the ~U$1.5/mmBTU of fixed transportation tariffs increase breakeven tariffs substantially.

Our assumptions include: i) 10% real unlevered IRR; ii) Capex/MW of U$1.2mn; iii) transportation tariffs of U$1.5/mmBTU for on-grid assets; iv) LNG leasing and take-or-pay costs of ~U$0.9/mmBTU; v) 34% tax rate and vi) depreciation is equal to the tenure of the contract (15 years). For the A Factor we have assumed the technical characteristics of the most advanced turbines available (turbines from GE, Siemens and Mitsubishi are similar between them).

Figure 25: Sensitivity Analysis to Off-Grid Marginal Prices (XPe)



Figure 24: LRCap Pricing Analysis (XPe)

LNG Cost Build-Up	US$/mmBTU
Gas Price (LT Henry Hub)	4.0
Liquefaction	2.0
Freight Cost (Bz-ME/Africa)	1.0
Regas Cost	0.8
Natural Gas Premium – (JKM + Spread)	7.0
Total Price (JKM Proxy)	14.8

Assumptions (XPe)	
Capex/MW (US$ mn)	1.2
Unlevered IRR (%)	10%
Transportation Cost (US$/mmBTU)	1.5
LNG leasing (US$/mmBTU)	0.3
Take-or-Pay (assuming 5% of Gas Price)	0.6

	New Thermal On-Grid	New Thermal Off-Grid
Auction Price in R$/MWh	342	286
All-In Price @ Auction (R$'000/MW)	3,000	2,509
Fixed Revenue (R$'000/MW)	2,768	2,277
Transmission	137	137
O&M	167	167
Capital Cost	1,604	1,604
Take-or-Pay	246	246
LNG Terminal Leasing	0	123
Gas Transportation	614	0
Factor A * CVU (R$'000/MW)	232	232
CVU (R$/MWh)	690	690
Heat Rate	8.5	8.5
Fuel Unit Cost	14.8	14.8
Fx (BRL/USD)	5.5	5.5
Factor A (hours)	336	336
Time On	5.1	5.1
Ramp Up	0.6	0.6
Ramp Down	0.5	0.5
G Min/G Max	0.5	0.5
TOn - RUp - RD	4.0	4.0

Source: ONS, CCEE and XP Research

A Deep Dive on the LRCAP

A Bottom-Up Approach on Potential Cap Pricing for Eneva's Assets

While we believe there is room for Eneva to capture prices only marginally lower to cap prices, the uncertainty regarding how cap prices will be spread out by product and some dosage of being conservative from our end have made us assume in our base case that Eneva will re-contract both its existing capacity and Celse 2 (very competitive greenfield asset) at price of R$250/MWh, while its CEIBA greenfield combined with Termofortaleza at R$275/MWh (an ~15% and 5% discount to our estimated cap price for off-grid assets).

Below we highlight the specific characteristics of Eneva's assets compared to the "generic" thermal assets in our cap price build-up. The main points of attention will be:

i) naturally how competitive can Eneva be in its take or pay agreements for CEIBA/Fortaleza;
ii) capex estimates for Celse 2 and CEIBA (given that Eneva has most likely anticipated turbine acquisitions, how much will it bring in competitiveness especially for CEIBA) and
iii) how ill A Factors be built-up (we are assuming technical specifics of the turbines).

Figure 26: Eneva's asset-by-asset pricing build-up assuming R$251/MWh for existing thermal assets + Celse 2 and R$274/MWh for Ceiba and Fortaleza (XPe)

	Parnaiba 1	Parnaiba 3	Linhares 1	Povoação	Viana 1	Celse 2	CEIBA 1	Termofortaleza	Coal
Auction Price in R$/MWh	251	251	251	251	251	251	274	274	251
All-In Price @ Auction (R$'000/MW)	2,200	2,200	2,200	2,200	2,200	2,200	2,400	2,400	2,200
Fixed Revenue (R$'000/MW)	2,072	2,010	2,030	2,031	2,033	1,968	2,168	1,931	1,824
Transmission	137	137	72	102	118	137	137	137	115
O&M	89	270	90	111	101	167	167	167	365
Capital Cost	1,781	1,547	1,009	959	954	1,419	1,514	1,277	1,344
Fuel Fixed Costs	65	55	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Take-or-Pay	0	0	246	246	246	246	246	246	0
LNG Terminal Leasing	0	0	0	0	0	0	104	104	0
Gas Transportation	0	0	614	614	614	0	0	0	0
Factor A * CVU (R$'000/MW)	128	190	170	169	167	232	232	469	376
CVU (R$/MWh)	356	352	690	687	681	690	690	625	365
Heat Rate	10.8	10.7	8.5	8.5	8.4	8.5	8.5	7.7	0.4
Fuel Unit Cost	6.0	6.0	14.8	14.8	14.8	14.8	14.8	14.8	170.0
Fx (BRL/USD)	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.5
Factor A (hours)	360	540	246	246	246	336	336	750	1,032
Time On	5.5	8.5	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.1	5.1	12.0	16.0
Ramp Up	1.0	3.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.6	7.0	6.0
Ramp Down	0.5	1.0	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	6.0
G Min/G Max	0.5	0.5	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.6
TOn - RUp - RD	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.5	4.0

Source: ONS, CCEE and XP Research

Investment Thesis

Investment Thesis

Eneva (ENEV3; Buy; YE26 TP of R$27.1/sh.)

Investment Thesis: Eneva's investment thesis is all about the outcome of the upcoming LRCAP expected to be held in Mar/26. The company is extremely well positioned to be the main winner of the auction and we expect (and assume in our base case) that the company will be able to: i) re-contract P1 and P3 at fixed revenues of R$2.2mn/MW (R$7/sh in our base case); ii) re-contract its coal assets at R$2.2mn/MW (R$1.5/sh); iii) win its 1.2GW expansion in Sergipe (R$1.5/sh) with a fixed revenue of R$2.2mn/MW and iv) re-contract 148MW of certain thermal assets recently acquired from BTG (R$0.4/sh). Additionally, we are optimistic that ENEV could be even more successful in the auction and eventually win a new greenfield asset (CEIBA) that opens a new LNG hub in Ceará while it also enables to re-contract Termofortaleza (this scenario adds R$1.4/sh to our base case). Beyond the auction, we see ENEV as a LT compounder in a sector that still presents relevant growth opportunities, especially for a player such as Eneva that combines a top-tier management team and a portfolio of assets with structural competitive advantages that allow for outsized returns.

LT Compounder: ENEV is a natural compounder. The company is structured in a way that growth at accretive returns is the compass, in a market that will still have relevant growth avenues for years to come. We are believers that LT winners in infrastructure investing combine: i) financial discipline and impeccable capital allocation track record; ii) top-tier group of people with the right incentives and iii) exposure to a growing market with healthy economics. We see Eneva having all these elements.

Catalysts: i) the reserve capacity auction; (ii) new growth announcements in other segments such as SSLNG or M&As; and (iii) new commercial agreements that further consolidate the view that ENEV has been able to find ways to monetize its flexible capacity/excess gas through other alternatives.

Risks: i) negative outcomes in the reserve capacity auction could be a relevant source of downside; ii) any deterioration in the macro front and iii) structural regulatory changes (such as fast-growing BESS adoption) that limit the need for new thermal capacity (or at least reduce the perception of such need).

Valuation, Rating and Target Price: At current prices we see ENEV trading at a real IRR of 12.7%, compared to its generation peers avg. of 8.4%. We have a YE26 TP of R$27.1/sh. Using a real cost of equity of 10.0%. We are **Buy-rated** on Eneva.

Figure 27: Eneva Estimates (XPe) vs. Consensus

(R$ mn)	2025e	2026e	2027e	2028e
Net Revenues (XPe)	14,940	8,612	11,885	13,359
Net Revenues (Consensus)	11,099	9,441	13,013	14,296
Delta XPe vs. Consensus (%)	34.6%	-8.8%	-8.7%	-6.6%
EBITDA (XPe)	6,866	5,558	8,294	9,345
EBITDA (Consensus)	6,621	5,625	7,490	8,152
Delta XPe vs. Consensus (%)	3.7%	-1.2%	10.7%	14.6%
Net Income (XPe)	1,622	941	3,000	3,572
Net Income (Consensus)	1,834	1,093	2,914	3,395
Delta XPe vs. Consensus (%)	-11.6%	-13.9%	3.0%	5.2%

Figure 28: Eneva Sum of the Parts (XPe)



Figure 29: Eneva EBITDA Breakdown by Subsidiary

EBITDA (R$mn)	2025e	2026e	2027e	2028e
Consolidated	**6,866**	**5,558**	**8,294**	**9,345**
Parnaiba 1 to 6	1,337	1,317	1,461	993
Azulao + Jaguatirica	495	589	2,533	2,635
Sergipe Hub	2,125	2,005	2,078	2,683
Coal	628	662	777	946
Thermal Assets - 3rd Party Gas	1,856	558	636	720
SSLNG	267	304	430	517
Holding + Futura + Upstream	159	122	378	851

Source: Company Data, and XP Research

Investment Thesis

Gauging the Wide Range of Scenarios

What's in our base case: For the assets involved in the auction we assume that all existing assets will be re-contracted at R$2.2mn/MW, while we assume ENEV will successfully auction Celse 2 at the same price. Additionally, we assume the company will successfully auction CEIBA and re-contract Termofortaleza, opening a new LNG hub in Ceara. In terms of dispatch, our base case assumes a LT dispatch for the Parnaiba complex of ~45% and for the Azulão + Jaguatirica assets an ~60% (70% for Jaguatirica and ~55% for the Azulão complex). Additionally, we assume LT flexibility margins for its Celse LNG terminal at U$0.75/mmBTU considering that 100% of the capacity will be monetized. For the SSLNG, we assume no further expansions but assume 100% of the ~900k m³/day will be monetized at an average tariff of of ~U$14/mmBTU. At our base case we see ENEV trading at a 12.7% real IRR.

Figure 30: Base and Bull Case Build-Up



What would a realistic bear case look like: In our view a realistic bear case would be: i) P1, P3, BTG assets and Coal re-contracted at lower prices (the level is questionable, but we are conservatively assuming R$1.8mn/MW); Celse 2 isn't auctioned, neither CEIBA and Fortaleza; iii) thermal dispatch in Parnaiba is ~10p.p. lower than in our base case and in Azulão ~5p.p.; iv) no monetization of Celse LNG capacity, and no monetization of SSLNG after the current contracts are terminated). In this scenario, we see ENEV's fair value @10% in real terms of R$ 18.4/sh. At our bear case scenario we currently see ENEV trading at a 7.1% real IRR.

Figure 31: Bear Case Build-Up



Source: Company Data, and XP Research

Investment Thesis

Optionalities Beyond the LRCap

Beyond the LRCap event that justifies a bullish view standalone, we believe Eneva has several other avenues of LT growth that are still very hard to price but should be very much taken into consideration:

i) the first and most obvious, with the current dispatch and sales estimates we have, the Parnaiba complex will still have ~15bcm (or an equivalent of ~4mn m³/day for 10 years) of gas that isn't being monetized in our model. Assuming a multiple of ~U$1/mmBTU, the unexplored gas could be worth R$1-1.5/sh. Azulão will still have some gas left in our estimates but, a small ~2bcm;

ii) the Jurua field in the Solimoes basin (20bcm in 2C reserves) is an obvious solution for the LT gas supply of the Amazonas region. With rapidly depleting gas production in the Urucu field and a potentially relevant reduction in transportation tariffs from the Urucu-Coari-Manaus pipeline, the gas from Jurua could be a relevant source of supply to the gas demands of Manaus and its thermal assets Maua and Aparecida (owned by J&F).

iii) Eneva has been evolving in its development studies of the Parana basin and the company believes that the basin has several characteristics similar to those of the Paranaiba basin. Any declaration of commercial viability could be an interesting new growth avenue that creates perhaps the most strategic onshore gas asset in the country located close to the Southeast/South regions where demand is.

iv) The company still has ~6-7GW of thermal capacity to be developed after CEIBA and Celse 2, with projects that could enable new LNG hubs and/or could be expansions of already developed clusters;

v) New gas trading avenues shouldn't be ruled out as we are in the early innings of the liberalization of the market and new demand/structures should enable Eneva to capture more of this market with its competitive and flexible natural gas offerings;

vi) M&As. Eneva is now a gas powerhouse and bolt-on/smaller acquisitions of both onshore E&P and/or thermal or LNG assets have tremendous strategic fit and could be made at very accretive terms for the company, that has a well aligned BoD and management team.

Although these optionalities are still very hard to price, the odds of part (or most) of them materializing overtime are high, and sustain our view that Eneva is a long-term compounder with a powerful combination of growth at very attractive returns. These paths should be one of the pillars that justify Eneva trading at a tighter ERP relative to other premium names, as well as the growing fixed-revenue base the company is creating that reduce cash flow risks and increase visibility.

Investment Thesis

Eneva (ENEV3; Buy; YE26 TP of R$27.1/sh.)

Figure 32: Eneva Factsheet

# of Shares	1,937

Ticker	Rating	TP YE26	Price	U/D
ENEV3	Buy	27.1	19.87	36.5%
Real Implied IRR	12.7%	Duration	8.0	
Real Cost of Equity	10.0%			

Operational KPIs	2025e	2026e	2027e	2028e
Dispatch Parnaiba Complex	37%	29%	29%	40%
Dispatch Azulao	0%	0%	48%	50%
Dispatch Jaguatirica	77%	70%	70%	70%
Parnaiba Gas Reserves, bcm	**34.8**	**33.7**	**32.6**	**31.1**
Parnaiba Gas Production, mn m³/day	4.6	2.9	3.0	4.1
Azulao Gas Reserves, bcm	**9.6**	**9.4**	**8.9**	**8.5**
Azulao Gas Production, mn m³/day	0.6	0.6	1.2	1.3
Celse Flexibility Contracts, mn m³/day	**10.3**	**8.4**	**8.0**	**9.4**
Flexibility Margins, in U$/mmBTU	0.6	0.7	0.7	0.7
SSLNG Sold Volumes, mn m³/day	**0.4**	**0.6**	**0.8**	**0.9**
SSLNG Sales Price, in U$/mmBTU	14.3	13.1	13.3	13.2

Yields	2025e	2026e	2027e	2028e
Dividend Yield	0.0%	0.0%	1.8%	6.7%
Earnings Yield	4.2%	2.4%	7.8%	9.3%
FCFE Yield	3.4%	-0.3%	0.8%	7.0%
	30/11/2025	31/12/2026	31/12/2027	31/12/2028

3-Year IRR Exit Scenarios	2025e	2026e	2027e	2028e
Entry Price	-19.9			
DPS	0.0	0.0	0.4	1.3
Exit Price				35.9
Investor-level Cash Flow	-19.9	0.0	0.4	37.3
Nominal IRR	23.0%			
Real Implied IRR to Maturity	12.7%			
Real Ke @ Exit Year	10.0%			

P&L	2024a	2025e	2026e	2027e	2028e
Net Revenues	**11,388**	**14,940**	**8,612**	**11,885**	**13,359**
COGS	-3,633	-5,459	-1,194	-1,365	-1,495
Opex & Expenses	-3,865	-2,680	-1,860	-2,226	-2,519
adj. EBITDA	**3,969**	**6,866**	**5,558**	**8,294**	**9,345**
Parnaiba 1 to 6	1,271	1,337	1,317	1,461	993
Azulao + Jaguatirica	408	495	589	2,533	2,635
Sergipe Hub	1,461	2,125	2,005	2,078	2,683
Coal	552	628	662	777	946
Thermal Assets - 3rd Party Gas	0	1,856	558	636	720
SSLNG	-5	267	304	430	517
Holding + Futura + Upstream	282	159	122	378	851
EBIT	**2,200**	**4,080**	**2,485**	**4,959**	**5,675**
Financial Results	-3,562	-1,338	-1,610	-1,597	-1,562
EBT	**-1,361**	**2,742**	**875**	**3,363**	**4,114**
Income Taxes	1,899	-723	66	-362	-542
Income Tax Rate	*140%*	*26%*	*-8%*	*11%*	*13%*
Equity Income	7	2	0	0	0
Minorities	507	399	0	0	0
Net Income	**37**	**1,622**	**941**	**3,000**	**3,572**
Announced Dividends	**0**	**0**	**0**	**706**	**2,590**
Payout	*0%*	*0%*	*0%*	*24%*	*73%*
FCFE	**n.a.**	**1,305**	**-114**	**299**	**2,702**
FCFE as a % of Net Income	*n.a.*	*80%*	*-12%*	*10%*	*76%*
Net Debt	**17,314**	**18,957**	**18,629**	**17,333**	**15,621**
Net Debt/EBITDA	*4.4x*	*2.8x*	*3.4x*	*2.1x*	*1.7x*

Multiples @ Target	2025e	2026e	2027e	2028e
EV/EBITDA	10.4x	12.8x	8.4x	7.3x
P/E	32.4x	55.8x	17.5x	14.7x

Multiples @ Market	2025e	2026e	2027e	2028e
EV/EBITDA	8.4x	10.3x	6.7x	5.8x
P/E	23.7x	40.9x	12.8x	10.8x

Source: Company Data, and XP Research

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